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RECENT DECISIONS
Party. Until that decision is rendered it is up to the court's discretion
to preserve our procedural safeguards, but yet to dispense justice as
facilely and quickly as possible. To that discretion we entrust this
problem.
Carl F. Eiberger, Jr.

RECENT DECISIONS
By LEx
In re May's Estate, 305 N.Y. 486, 114
N.E.2d 4 (1953). The respondent, Sam May, and the decedent, his niece
by the half blood, at all times were domiciled in New York. In contravention of a New York statute, N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 5(3), which
branded marriage between uncle and niece as incestuous and void, they
were married in nearby Rhode Island. Being of Jewish descent, the
parties contracted a valid marriage by virtue of an exception to Rhode
Island laws on incest, R. I. GEN. LAws c. 415, §§ 4, 9 (1938), whereby
persons of the Jewish faith within the degrees of consanguinity and affinity allowed by their religion, are permitted to marry. Two weeks after
the ceremony the respondent May and the decedent returned to New
York where they lived as man and wife for thirty-two years until decedent's death. Subsequently, the respondent filed an objection to the issuance to petitioner, one of six children born of the marriage, of the letters
of administration of the estate of the decendent, upon the ground that
he is the surviving husband and accordingly has the permanent right to
administer her estate. In affirming the lower court's decision, 280 App.
Div. 647, 117 N.Y.S.2d 345 (3d Dep't 1952), the Court of Appeals of
New York, notwithstanding the aforementioned statute which declares
such a marriage void, held that the marriage was valid, and granted the
letters to the respondent as decedent's surviving husband.
The principal issue involved is whether a state whose statutes unequivocally declare marriages between uncle and niece to be incestuous
and void must recognize such a marriage between its domiciliaries as
existing and valid because lawfully celebrated in another state.
CONFLICT OF LAWS

-

FOREIGN MARRIAGE INCESTUOUS

DomiciIn HELD VALID. -

74 In all fairness it must be mentioned that a Communist-action organization as
defined in the Act must be shown to have a connection with the world communist
movement. This item might have been hard to prove though it might easily have
been proved that the party advocates force and violence in the overthrow of the
government. This leads to another question: can judicial notice be taken of the control over American parties and organizations by the Russian (or other foreign)
organizations? That this was attempted in New York as regards church factions see
article by this writer 28 Nom DA E LAW. 398, 399 (1953).
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The rule that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere is
so well recognized by American courts, for reasons of general policy, that
it has almost become a maxim in the field of conflict of laws. Fensterwald
v. Burk, 129 Md. 131, 98 AtI. 358 (1916); Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N.Y. 602
(1882); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121 (1934). However,
this rule has been held to rest on comity alone, Commonwealth v. Custer,
145 Pa. Super. 535, 21 A.2d 524, 526 (1941); and to be subject to the
principle that: "Every state has the power to determine who shall assume or occupy the matrimonial relationship within its borders." Toler
v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., 173 Va. 425, 4 S.E.2d 364, 366
(1939).
Accordingly, two major exceptions to the general rule have, for all
practical purposes, achieved universal acceptance by American courts.
The first of these is ordinarily made in the case of a marriage repugnant
to the laws of nature as generally recognized in Christian countries, with
reference specifically to incest, United States ex rel. Devine v. Rodgers,
109 Fed. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1901); polyandry, People v. Kay, 141 Misc.
574, 252 N.Y. Supp. 518 (N.Y. City Mag. Ct. 1931); polygamy, Earle
v. Earle, 141 App. Div. 611, 126 N.Y. Supp. 317 (1st Dep't 1910); or
miscegenation, Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231 Pac. 483 (1924).
The main point of consideration herein is the operation of the exception in reference to incestuous unions. While the exception appears
relatively simple at first glance, its application poses many difficulties, not
the least of which is to determine what constitutes an incestuous marriage. As early as 1856, the courts limited the term "incestuous" to marriages (1) between persons in the direct lineal line of consanguinity, such
as a marriage between father and daughter, grandfather and granddaughter, and (2) marriages among the collaterals of the first degree,
such as brothers and sisters; said marriages being regarded as against
the law of God according to standards of morality generally prevailing in
Christendom. Stevenson v. Gray, 56 Ky. (17 B.Mon.) 193 (1856). A
more difficult question and one that has frequently arisen concerns the
status of a marriage between uncle and niece, Audley v. Audley, 196
App. Div. 103, 187 N.Y. Supp. 652 (1st Dep't 1921), or aunt and
nephew, Martin v. Martin, 54 W.Va. 301, 46 S.E. 120 (1903). At least
one court, while basing its decision upon a statute, N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW
§ 5, stated that, "[The Bible] specifically prohibits marriage between
nephew and aunt." Incuria v. Incuria, 155 Misc. 755, 280 N.Y. Supp.
716, 719 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1935). However true this may be, whatever additions that have been made to the prohibited degrees as annunciated in Stevenson v. Gray, supra, have been made by local rules or
laws as dictated by local policy in individual states, and such additions
are not to be regarded as a part of the divine law as to incest.
The lex loci contractus rule is subject to a second exception with
reference to a marriage repugnant to the public policy of the domicile of
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the parties, Gilbert v. Gilbert, 275 Ky. 559, 122 S.W.2d 137 (1938).
There is considerable authority in this country supporting the view that
although the degree of relationship is not within the prohibition as to
incest of the divine law as understood in Christendom, a marriage celebrated in, and valid under the law of another jurisdiction, if prohibited
by the law of the forum, will not be there recognized as valid. United
States ex rel. Devine v. Rodgers, supra, Johnson v. Johnson, 57 Wash.
89, 106 Pac. 500 (1910). This is particularly so if the parties were at the
time of the celebration domiciled in such forum and went to another
state for the purpose of having the marriage performed, returning to
their domicile immediately thereafter. Osoinach v. Watkins, 235 Ala.
564, 180 So. 577 (1938). The District Court in the Rodgers case, in
reiterating the exception to the general rule pointed out, 109 Fed. at 887:
If the relation thus entered into elsewhere, although lawful in the foreign
country, is stigmatized as incestuous by the law of Pennsylvania, no rule
of comity requires a court sitting in this state to recognize the foreign
marriage as valid.

A close parallel can be drawn between the instant case and Osoinach
v. Watkins, supra, which involved a similar controversy over who should
be granted letters of administration of an estate. This latter case concerned the marriage of a nephew to the widow of his deceased uncle, both
domiciled in Alabama. The marriage was contracted in Georgia, where
such a union is considered valid. The court held that under the statutes
of Alabama, as recodified, ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 325 (1940), such a marriage is absolutely void ab initio, even though it was contracted in another state where such marriage was valid. Consequently, on the death of
the nephew, the alleged widow was not granted any right of property in
his estate.
In the instant case, the majority of the court ruled that the statute
making marriage between an uncle and his niece incestuous and thus void
according to the law of New York, N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 5(3), had no
extra territorial effect and therefore should not be extended by judicial
construction. The court based its decision on Van Voorhis v. Brintnall,
86 N.Y. 17 (1881), in which a foreign marriage in apparent contravention of N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 8, forbidding the guilty party in a New
York divorce judgment to marry again within a certain time, was sustained on the ground that § 8 being penal in character there was no
legislative intent to give it effect outside the territorial limits of the
state. However, the instant case is readily distinguished from this case
as it is concerned with § 5, which holds as void certain marriages, an
object totally alien to that of § 8 as construed in the Van Voorhis case,
supra.

In the light of what has been said, § 5 may be taken as expressive of
the strongest public policy. Thus, it follows that the instant case falls
squarely within the second exception to the lex loci principle, as being
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repugnant to the public policy of the domicile of the parties. We are
inclined to agree with the well-reasoned dissent in the instant case that
the decision in effect contravenes the express intentions of the legislature
as manifested in § 5 (3). In addition, there is merit in the contention that
such a marriage may be contrary to the principles of natural law and
morality as generally recognized in Christian countries, and thus falls
within the first exception to the general rule.
It is submitted that if a citizen of a foreign state, in which polygamy
is legal, would bring his half dozen or so legal wives to our country, the
marriage of the six spouses to the one spouse would hardly be considered
legal or valid by us. The reason is that there is a positive law against
polygamy. Equally so, there is a positive law against marriage between
nephew and aunt. Can it be said that the latter is less positive than the
former, and therefore allow it to be thwarted by the mere crossing of a
state line? The majority of the court in the instant case has taken this
view by ruling that a marriage contrary to the positive law of New York
will be recognized if it is considered valid in the sister state where it was
performed, which appears to be stretching the lex loci contractus rule
beyond its legal and logical limits.
John A. Vuono

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

EQUAL PROTECTION -

ENFORCEMENT OF

RACIAL RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS. - Barrows v. Jackson,----U.S ..... , 73
Sup. Ct. 1031 (1953). The petitioner brought an action for breach of a

covenant running with the land which restricted non-Caucasians from
the use and occupancy of real property within a certain neighborhood.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint and the District
Court of Appeals for the Second Appellate District affirmed, 112 Cal.
App.2d 534, 247 P.2d 99 (1952). The Supreme Court of California
denied hearing and certiorari was granted, 345 U.S. 902 (1953).
Can a party to a racial restrictive covenant seek damages for breach
thereof by way of an action at law in a state court? The categorical
answer of the Supreme Court is in the negative.
Five years ago the Supreme Court held that racial restrictive covenants could not be enforced in the state courts by way of a suit in equity.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In that decision equitable relief
via an injunction to oust non-Caucasians from real property was denied

as unconstitutional under the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants (Negroes) were the actual persons at
whom the restrictive covenant was aimed; the plaintiffs seeking to have
the state courts enjoin them from occupying property described in the
covenant. The majority opinion stressed that the mere making of the
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covenant was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and, "So long
as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action
." Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, at 13. The plaintiffs argued
by the State...
that judicial enforcement of the covenants would not amount to state
action. The Court struck this down with numerous references to prior
decisions and concluded, Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, at 18:
The short of the matter is that from the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment until the present, it has been the consistent ruling
of this Court that the action of the States to which the Amendment has
reference includes action of state courts and state judicial officials.

Action by the state courts could then be nothing else but discriminatory
action expressly prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Shelley case started in the Missouri courts. A companion case
with a similiar set of facts and decided in the same opinion originated in
Michigan, McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The rule was applied in
a District of Columbia case in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
The rule announced in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, has now been extended to include actions at law for breach of racial restrictive covenants.
By the decision in the instant case, the Supreme Court has relegated the
racial restrictive covenant to the role of a legal non-entity.
Legal writers anticipated the decision in the instant case after Shelley
v. Kraemer, supra, but not without qualms and uneasy reflection. Scanlan, Racial Restrictions In Real Estate - Property Values Versus
Human Values, 24 NoTRE DAME LAW. 157 (1949); Ming, Racial Re-

strictions And The Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant
Cases, 16 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 203 (1949). Why did the Court see a need
for reaffirmation of the Shelley case principles? The reason stated was,
Barrows v. Jackson, supra, 73 Sup. Ct. at 1033:
because of the importance of the constitutional question involved and
to consider the conflict which has arisen in the decisions of the state courts
since our ruling in the Shelley case, supra.
...

The respondent in the instant case could not claim the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment for herself. Her defense lay in the invasion
of the rights of others if the courts acted to enforce the racial restrictive
covenant against her. The Court remembered its own rule in such situations; that the party before the Court should not set up constitutional
rights of third parties as a defense. The late Chief Justice Vinson, who
delivered the majority opinion in the Shelley case, prodded its memory
in his vigorous dissenting opinion. Fortunately, and some will say
inevitably, the Court freed itself from its own restrictions, Barrows v.
Jackson, supra, 73 Sup. Ct. at 1035:
This is a salutary rule, the validity of which we reaffirm. But in the
instant case, we are faced with a unique situation in which it is the action
of the state court which might result in the denial of constitutional rights
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and in which it would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose
rights are asserted to present their grievance before any court. Under the
peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe the reasons which underlie
our rule denying standing to raise another's rights, which is only a rule of
practice, are outweighed by the need to protect fundamental rights which
would be denied by permitting the damages action to be maintained.

Three state cases and one from the District of Columbia spotlighted
the need for the decision in the instant case. A brief examination of the
conflict is enlightening. Suits at law for breach of racial restrictive covenants were dismissed under the Shelley rule in Michigan, Phillips v. Naff,
332 Mich. 389, 52 N.W.2d 158 (1952); and in the District of Columbia,
Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp. 604 (D.D.C. 1950).
But lack of concurrence was demonstrated by the Missouri Supreme
Court in Weiss v. Leaon, 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W.2d 127 (1949), even
though the court refused to allow equitable enforcement of a restrictive
covenant. Damages for breach of the covenant were sought in the same
suit and the problem was plainly stated, 225 S.W.2d at 131:
We are of the opinion that an action for damages for the breach of a
valid agreement need not be affected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
United States Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on this question up
to this writing so far as we are able to determine.

The old trick of the financially irresponsible straw man was used in an
attempt to circumvent a possible successful suit for breach of covenant
in Correll v. Earley, 205 Okla. 366, 237 P.2d 1017 (1951). The Oklahoma Supreme Court gave lip service to Shelley by refusing equitable
relief via cancellation of the deeds of Negroes, but the Fourteenth
Amendment was lost in the shadow of the ruse of the straw man and the
consequent action for damages. The real issue of equal protection was
subordinated to the minor issue of the conspiracy to violate the racial
restrictive covenant and to avoid damages. The fact that racial restrictive
covenants were valid per se was utilized to justify state sanction of a
suit for breach. The all-important qualifying fact was ignored; namely,
that enforcement of such covenants must be by voluntary individual
adherence only and not by state action, Shelley v. Kraemer, supra.
The need for another racial restrictive covenant decision in an action
at law for its breach was evident. The instant case provided the necessary
set of operative facts on which the Court could clearly enunciate its
views. Whether intentionally or not, the Court emphasized the great
necessity and importance "of the ruling with its unequivocal handling of
the "rights of others" issue. And this was done, in the face of "A line of
decisions - long enough to warrant the respect of even the most hardened skeptic of the strength of stare decisis. . .

."

Barrows v. Jackson,

supra, 73 Sup. Ct. at 1038. Obviously a violation of the guarantee of
equal protection of the law was not to be allowed, at least in this instance,
by way of a technical legal subterfuge. The loopholes of the Shelley case
had to be plugged firmly and with unmistakable vigor and determination.
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The dismissal of three other contentions of the petitioners in four
short paragraphs of the majority opinion also contributes to the complete
disintegration of the racial restrictive covenant. The claim that unidentifiable group rights were being asserted was discounted inasmuch as the
personal rights of particular non-Caucasians to the use of the land were
being violated. Likewise, when the sanctity of contract was raised as an
issue, the petitioners were reminded that the Constitution provides for
protections of contracts from legislative action, not the courts. And
finally, the ironical twist of the petitioners themselves claiming a denial
of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment is
answered by a quotation from Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 22:
The Constitution confers upon no individual the right to demand action
by the State which results in the denial of equal protection of the laws to
other individuals.

The decision in the instant case should settle the fate of the racial
restrictive covenant in the courts. Parties to existing restrictive covenants
will have to face the fact that personal bigotry plus lack of a profitable
offer to breach will be the major deterrents to the breakdown of the
covenant. But bias and bigotry are ready victims of a gainful transaction, especially when there can be no retribution in the form of a suit
for damages. Nevertheless, discrimination and consequent segregation
will not be eliminated by the decision in the instant case. However, it is
significant insofar as the Court reflects changing public policy and social
attitude.
After the Shelley case a wealth of legal writing appeared that analyzed
the subject from all angles. As has already been mentioned, the instant
case was anticipated. So also were many schemes advanced whereby
racial discrimination in real property interests could be continued in
defiance of the Shelley case rule. There was speculation as to the effectiveness of various plans such as corporate land holding, real estate
clubs, block captain setups, etc. Scanlan, supra, 24 NOTRE DAME LAW.
157, 182-6 (1949). So far only the racial restrictive covenant has been
put to the ultimate test - and found wanting. The test of any other
discriminatory plans would necessitate that the parties look to the courts
for enforcement. A fair presumption is that most lawyers will be extremely hesitant to advise a client that a particular racial restrictive
scheme can guarantee them bigotted serenity.
Robert D. LeMense

LITERARY PROPERTY -

WRONGFUL APPROPRIATION OF AN IDEA. -

Belt v. Hamilton Nat. Bank, 108 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1952). The
plaintiff, who was in the advertising business, conceived an idea for a
radio program. The radio program involved the use of school children
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who possessed vocal and instrumental talent. The plaintiff presented this
concept to the defendant, indicating that he expected compensation if
his idea was used. The radio program appealed to the defendant, and it
engaged the plaintiff at twenty-five dollars a week to make preparations
with the understanding that it could terminate the working agreement
on two weeks notice. Since the plan incorporated the use of school children, permission from the school authorities had to be obtained. While
awaiting the approbation of the authorities the plaintiff was discharged.
Some time later the defendant received the school authorities' approval,
and it proceeded to put the plaintiff's idea into effect. The defendant
employed another advertising agency for this purpose; the plaintiff
received no compensation. Being the originator of the idea, the plaintiff
brought suit for its wrongful appropriation. The jury rendered a verdict
in his favor, and the defendant moved for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.
In denying the defendant's motion the court held that the common
law, ever-changing to meet the needs of society, will protect the originator's property rights in an idea where that idea is concrete, original,
and novel.
It has been a standing principle in law that property rights in ideas
are not protected by copyright statutes. Statutory copyright does not
protect property in ideas but only the tangible material form in which
the author expresses them. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880); Ansehl
v. PuritanPharmaceuticalCo., 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932); Dymow v.
Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926); Shipman v. RKO Radio Pictures,
Inc., 20 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd, 100 F.2d 533 (2d Cir.
1938). In Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674 (1879), where the plaintiff
sought to protect a method of mapping, the court held that the copyright
did not protect his ideas but only gave him -the exclusive right of multiplying copies of what he had written or printed.
It also has been a principle of the common law that the law will not
recognize property rights in mere abstract ideas. O'Brien v. RKO Radio
Pictures,Inc., 68 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Plus Promotions,Inc. v.
RCA Mfg. Co., 49 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
But where prior to disclosure the originator forms an express contract
with those to whom he is about to reveal his idea, the common law will
protect the author's property even in an abstract idea. The court in
Alberts v. Remington Rand, Inc., 175 Misc. 486, 23 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup.
Ct. 1940), held that, in the absence of an express agreement, the originator or proprietor of an idea which could not be sold or negotiated without
disclosure could not hold another liable for its use. Moore v. Ford Motor
Co., 28 F.2d 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1928); Rodriquez v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 259 App. Div. 224, 18 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1st Dep't 1940), aff'd, 285
N.Y. 667, 34 N.E.2d 375 (1941); Stone v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
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Co., 260 App. Div. 450, 23 N.Y.S.2d 210 (lst Dep't 1940); Williamson
v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 258 App. Div. 226, 16 N.Y.S.2d 217 (2d Dep't
1939).
In Soule v. Bon Ami Co., 201 App. Div. 794, 195 N.Y. Supp. 574 (2d
Dep't 1922), aff'd, 235 N.Y. 608, 139 N.E. 754 (1923), the court pointed out that ideas which were to be the consideration and the subject in a
contract must be novel and new to be legal consideration. No one by
contract could monopolize an idea which belongs to the common stock.
The author of an abstract idea may not recover in an action based on
the theory of implied contract for its use by another., Stanley v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, 192 P.2d 495, 501 (Cal. 1948), afl'd, 208 P.2d
9 (1949), 35 Cal.2d 653, 221 P.2d 73 (1950). However, the courts will
grant protection to an author's property right in his idea in an action
based on the theory of implied contract when the idea is concrete, new
and novel. In Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, supra, the
plaintiff introduced a radio program to the defendant and the court in
affirming the decision stated, 221 P.2d at 75:
...the right of the originator of an idea to recover from one who uses
or infringes it seems to depend upon whether or not the idea was novel
and reduced to concrete form prior to its appropriation by the defendant,
and, where the idea was disclosed by the originator to the appropriator,
whether such disclosure took place under circumstances indicating that
compensation was expected if the idea was used.

Such circumstances that would indicate expectation of payment for the
use of a concrete and novel idea existed in Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.
v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N.E. 206 (1935), where the plaintiff
informed the defendant in a letter that a reasonable charge would be
expected if his advertising scheme was used. In Ryan & Associates, Inc.
v. Century Brewing Ass'n, 185 Wash. 600, 55 P.2d 1053 (1936), the
defendant solicited plaintiff's advertising slogan and the plaintiff in submitting his idea warned defendant that the use of the slogan was forbidden unless arrangements were made. -The defendant used the slogan
without permission and the plaintiff recovered on the theory of quantum
meruit. Cf. American Mint Corp. v. Ex-Lax, Inc., 263 App. Div. 89, 31
N.Y.S.2d 708 (1st Dep't 1941).
Another interesting point concerning an author's right to property in
an idea was stated in Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N.J. Eq. 575, 64 AtI. 436
(Ch. 1906), aff'd, 75 N.J. Eq. 623, 73 At. 1118 (Ct. Err. & App. 1909),
where the court denied equitable relief to the plaintiff who had revealed
to the defendant a scheme for combining the white lead industries. It
was pointed out that the plaintiff had no means to effectuate his plan,
and therefore he lacked control over his idea. This scheme, the court
said, could not be called property, for the originator could not apply it
to his own use. Cf. Universal Say. Corp. v. Morris Plan Co., 234 Fed.
382,386 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
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The question of whether or not an idea is concrete is one of law.
Golding v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690, 221 P.2d 95, 97 (1950).
In Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, supra, 192 P.2d at 503,
the court in discussing what was a concrete idea referred to definitions
found in Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1936) in
which "abstract" is defined as, "Considered apart from any application
to a particular object;" and "concrete" as, "Having a specific application; particular." A slogan "Neighborly Haberle" revealed to the defendant brewery orally was found to be abstract where the author
brought suit for its use in Bailey v. Haberle Congress Brewing Co., 193
Misc. 723, 85 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (Syracuse Munic. Ct. 1948). An idea for a
ship-to-shore radio service for travelers was found to lack specific application in Rodriquez v. Western Union Telegraph Co., supra, while in
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, supra, the plaintiff was allowed
to recover for the use of an advertising idea consisting of two men, one
offering the other a cigarette and receiving a reply of, "No thanks; I
smoke Chesterfields." The court considered this idea to be concrete.
But even though an idea is concrete and the author expresses his desire
for compensation an implied contract will not be assumed if the idea is
not new or original. Larson v. General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 294
(S.D.N.Y. 1941).
Whether an idea is new or novel is a question of fact. Dezendorf v.
Century-Fox Film Corp., 99 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1938); Shaw Advertising,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 112 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Ill. 1953). Novelty was
found to be lacking in the plaintiff's idea to solicit Negro patronage with
an advertising campaign employing the endorsements of outstanding
Negroes in Hampton v. LaSalle Hat Co., 88 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1949).
The court in the instant case found the plaintiff's idea to conform to
the requirements of novelty, concreteness, and originality. This coupled
with the fact that the plaintiff expected compensation was sufficient to
allow the plaintiff to recover for the use of that idea.
Whether the courts will further extend protection to property in ideas
in other instances as our society progresses and becomes more complex
will only be determined by the courts as such instances are pleaded before them.
Louis G. Basso, Jr.

PARTIES - SUBROGATION - PARTIALLY SUBROGATED INSURER As
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. - Powers v. Ellis, -. Ind ..... , 108 N.E.2d
132 (1952). The plaintiff brought an action to recover damages alleged
to have been sustained by reason of defendant's negligence in operating
a truck which struck and damaged plaintiff's fruit and grocery market.
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The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant
appealed asserting that among the errors committed by the trial court
was its overruling of defendant's motion to make plaintiff's insurance
company a party to the action, and its striking out of interrogatories
concerning possible assignment or subrogation of plaintiff's claim.
The Appellate Court of Indiana, in banc, two judges dissenting, reversed the trial court's decision, ruled that it was error to sustain the
plaintiff's motion to strike out interrogatories, and ordered a new trial,
.... Ind. App ..... 103 N.E.2d 907 (1952). On appeal to the Supreme Court
of Indiana the trial court's decision was reinstated, the court holding inter
alia, that joinder of the insurance company was not necessary, because
judgment satisfied against the defendant by the insured would fully
protect the defendant from further suit by the insurance company from
the same cause.
The basic question considered by the court concerns the interpretation
of a "Real Party In Interest" statute to determine whether the insurer or
insured is the proper party plaintiff in cases of partial or complete subrogation of claims. The difficulties which the Indiana courts have encountered in endeavoring to apply the statute to specific situations typify
the problems which have arisen in the majority of code states.
In examining the cases decided under "Real Party In Interest"
statutes, it is significant to note that the prime motive which prompted
the various states to include such provisions in their codes was the desire
to abandon the common law rule requiring actions to be brought by the
nominal plaintiff, i.e., the one whose legal right had been affected. It was
thought more desirable to adopt the equity rule which allowed anyone
with a beneficial interest in the controversy to become a party. "The aim
of the codifiers was a unified system of law and equity." Clark and
Hutchins, The Real PartyIn Interest, 34 YALE L.J. 259, 262 (1925).
In 1881, Indiana followed the wording used by many of the code
states and enacted a statute providing: "Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. . . ." Ind. Acts 1881
(Spec. Sess.), c. 38, § 3, p. 240. The Supreme Court of Indiana was first
compelled to interpret the statute with regard to subrogation of insurance rights in Cunningham v. Evansville & T.H.R.R., 102 Ind. 478, 1
N.E. 800 (1885). The defendant railroad company asserted that the
plaintiffs, whose property had been burned through sparks and coals
which escaped from defendant's engines, were not the real parties in
interest because of full reimbursement for such property loss by various
insurance companies. In holding that the plaintiffs (appellants) were the
proper parties the court stated, 102 Ind. at 482, 1 N.E. at 803:
The contracts of the appellants for the insurance of their property, with
the insurance companies, and their subsequent conduct in relation thereto,
are matters in which the appellee, as the wrongdoer, had no concern, and
which do not affect the measure of its liability.
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No distinction was made by the court between full and partial compensation; the insurance company being an unnecessary party in either case.
In rendering its decision, the court relied on earlier decisions in other
jurisdictions. Clark v. Wilson, 103 Mass. 219 (1869); Perrott v. Shearer, 17 Mich. 47 (1868); Weber v. Morris & Essex R.R., 35 N.J.L. 409
(Sup. Ct. 1872). It is interesting to note, however, that in these and
other cases cited as controlling, the decisions were rendered on the basis
of the common law and not in light of the "Real Party in Interest"
statutes.
While the courts of Indiana and several other jurisdictions continued
to follow the holding in the Cunningham case, supra, in cases of full
payment by the insurer, Citizens Gas & Oil Mining Co. v. Whipple, 32
Ind. App. 203, 69 N.E. 557 (1904); Illinois Central R.R. v. Hicklin, 131
Ky. 624, 115 S.W. 752 (1909); Alaska Pac. S.S. v. Sperry Flour Co., 94
Wash. 227, 162 Pac. 26 (1917); it became the majority rule that where
the insurance fully covered the loss, the insurer became the real party in
interest, and hence, was the only one entitled to sue. Southern Ry. v.
Stonewall Ins. Co., 163 Ala. 161, 50 So. 940 (1909); Atchison, T. &
S.F.R.R. v. Home Ins. Co., 59 Kan. 432, 53 Pac. 459 (1898); Powell
and Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E. 426 (1916).
Where the loss exceeded the insurance paid, however, the majority of
courts deemed the insured the proper party plaintiff. Solberg v. Minneapolis Willys-Knight Co., 177 Minn. 10, 224 N.W. 271 (1929); Harrington v. Central States Fire Ins. Co., 169 Okla. 255, 36 P.2d 738 (1934).
Indiana sided with the majority on this second proposition; its position
following naturally from the broader rule that the insured could sue
even under full subrogation. Cunningham v. Evansville & T.H.R.R.,
supra. Indiana also followed another majority trend and provided for
permissive joinder of insurer and insured in cases of partial subrogation.
Pittsburg C.C. & St.L.R.R. v. Home Ins. Co., 183 Ind. 355, 108 N.E.
525 (1915).
Apparently influenced by the increasing trend away from the position
held in the Cunningham case, supra, the Appellate Court of Indiana in
Boyd Motor Co. v. Claffey, 94 Ind. App. 492, 165 N.E. 255 (1932),
held that in a case of reimbursement for the entire loss suffered and full
assignment of claims to the insurance company, such company was the
only proper party plaintiff. In referring to the fully indemnified owner,
the court, emphasizing its point, quoted from an earlier case, Board of
Comm'rs v. Jameson,86 Ind. 154, 163 (1882):
It seems to us that he thus divested himself of all beneficial interest in the
claim, and vested it in the company. If he retained no substantial interest,
then his assignee became the real party in interest, and, under our code, was
the only proper plaintiff.

In a later Indiana case, Williamson v. Purity Bakeries, 101 Ind. App.
441, 193 N.E. 717 (1935), the court attempted to distinguish between a
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case wherein the insured had assigned his claim to the insurance company
before the commencement of the action (Claffey case, supra), and the
case before the court wherein the insured had been fully paid by his
insurance company, thereby subrogating the company to his claim. The
court ruled that in the former case the insurance company was the only
proper plaintiff, whereas in the latter instance the insured could sue as
the real party in interest. In ruling as it did in this case of complete
payment and subrogation, the court relied on the Cunningham case,
supra, differentiating it and the case at hand from the Claifey case, supra.
However, this supposed distinction has met with adverse criticism. E.g.,
10 IND. L.J. 528, 530 (1935): "The legal distinction between an assignment and subrogation can only be negligible, if any distinction can be
made at all." See also 2 GAviT, INDIANA PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 242
(1942).
The present case, then, concerns a situation different from that which
appeared in either the Claffey or Williamson cases, supra. Here we have
no question of complete subrogation, or full assignment of rights, but
instead, a case of part payment and subrogation. The appellate court did
not consider the question of a distinction between partial and complete
subrogation. The distinction between subrogation and assignment was
preserved, however, and a new trial was granted because the court below
had not allowed the defendant to determine by means of interrogatories
whether the plaintiff had completely assigned his claim.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Indiana, superseding the appellate court ruling, was based on the proposition that since recovery by the
plaintiff would be a complete bar to a further suit against the defendant
by the plaintiff's insurance company, the insured was the proper party
plaintiff. Although citing the Williamson case among the authorities for
the decision, the court avoided the question of possible distinction between assignment and subrogation. It did, however, state that as far as
the Claffey case was in conflict with the court's opinion, it was disapproved, 108 N.E.2d at 136. Although the statement is mere dicta and
not an express holding of the court, it tends to emphasize the court's
contention that the controlling factor under the "Real Party In Interest"
statutes is the fact that recovery by the insured will protect the tortfeasor from further litigation by the insurer. Although there is obvious
logic to this reasoning in a case such as the present one of partial subrogation, it is hoped that the court will not follow its indication of approval
of the Williamson case and disregard for the Claffey case, and extend
the rule to cases of complete subrogation or assignment, thereby allowing a suit to be brought by a plaintiff who has no beneficial interest
whatsoever in the outcome of the controversy. It would seem that the
designation of such a person as the real party in interest would contravene the express wording of the statute.
Harry D. Snyder, Jr.
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TORTS - LIBEL AND SLANDER CONSIDERATIONS DETERMINATIVE
OF WHETHER CHARGING ONE AS BEING A COMMUNIST IS SLANDEROUS
PER SE. - Lightfoot v. Jennings, -... Mo,...... 254 S.W.2d 596 (1953).

Plaintiff, Lightfoot, brought this action for actual and punitive damages
for slander and libel. Defendant, Jennings, filed a motion for dismissal.
Plaintiff alleged that after a public meeting and in the presence of approximately one hundred persons defendant approached and said: "You
are not going to talk here you damned communist." Plaintiff alleged that
the words were defamatory and slanderous, "Meaning and intending to
mean and being understood by those present to mean that plaintiff was
a member of the Communist Party and advocated, abetted, advised,
taught or encouraged the duty, necessity, desirability or propriety of
overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States."
Plaintiff premised the latter pleading upon the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §
2385 (Supp. 1952), a felony, which would render the words orally spoken
as being slanderous per se. There was no allegation of special damages.
The trial court sustained the defendant's motion for dismissal. The
Supreme Court of Missouri, citing as authority directly in point Von
Gerichten v. Seitz, 94 App. Div. 130, 87 N.Y. Supp. 968 (4th Dep't
1904), ruled that the petition stated a cause of action and reversed and
remanded the case. The rule in Missouri is that oral words imputing or
charging the commission of a crime amounting to a felony are defamatory
and actionable per se, even where the act imputed is a crime under the
laws of another jurisdiction, in the instant case, the laws of the United
States.
The question to be resolved by the Missouri Supreme Court was
whether the language relied upon was defamatory and slanderous per se.
The reading of cases relevant to this issue points up a second question:
how compelling should the "historical distinction" between libel and
slander be upon the courts today in reaching their decisions?
The imputation of political principles or practices objectionable to the
average person in the community has been recognized as defamatory and
actionable per se. Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257
(1947). It has quite generally been held libelous per se to falsely charge
a person with being a Communist. Utah State Farm Bureau Federation
v. National FarmersUnion Service Corp., 198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1952) ;
cf. Gallagherv. Chavalas, 48 Cal. App.2d 52, 119 P.2d 408 (App. Dep't
1941); Ward v. League for Justice, 93 N.E.2d 723 (Ohio App. 1950);
see also Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945).
Contra: McAndrew v. Scranton Republican Pub. Co., 364 Pa. 504, 72
A.2d 780, 784 (1950).
Two notable cases recently decid, d have held that it was not slanderous per se to charge orally that a person is a Communist. In Pecyk v.
Semoncheck, 157 Ohio St. 354, 105 N.E.2d 61 (1952), the plaintiff made
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no allegation of proof of special damages. The alleged defamatory words
(Communist or Communist sympathizer) were made at a meeting of the
Political Action Committee of the CIO in Cleveland, Ohio. The words
were held not to be slanderous per se the court stating in 105 N.E.2d
at 63:
In the instant case, there is nothing in the petition or in the evidence to
o indicate that... Pecyk was injured in his trade or calling by reason of the
scandalous statement made concerning him. Therefore, notwithstanding our
belief that such a statement would subject . . . Pecyk to public hatred,
ridicule and contempt by the vast majority of American citizens, yet,
without an allegation and proof of special damage, the words used herein
are not actionable. [Emphasis supplied].

In Keefe v. O'Brien, 203 Misc. 113, 116 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup.Ct. 1952),
an action was brought for slander asking for damages in the amount of
$20,000. It was held that to charge orally that a person is a Communist
is not slanderous per se. The court gave no sound basis for distinguishing
Mencher v. Chesley, supra, except that in that case the publication had
been written. The court stated in 116 N.Y.S.2d at 288:
To hold that calling one a communist is slander would unwittingly entrap
the unwary, for nothing would please Communists better than to enable
them to institute suits for damages promiscuously, regardless of the ultimate
outcome. It has been amply dqmonstrated that it is part of communist
doctrine and strategy to make the courtroom its forum for propaganda
purposes.

Is it not the function of our courts to determine whether a pleading is
sham or valid? In most instances in the law of libel and slander one
speaks at his own peril. Such a rationalization as this would but foster
injury to innocent persons.
The New York Supreme Court has also held that it is not libelous per
se to call a man a Communist since Communists can organize as a lawful
political party in the United States, and it is not for the courts to meddle
in political controversy. Garrigav. Richfield, 174 Misc. 315, 20 N.Y.S.
2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1940); cf. Hays v. American Defense Society Inc., 252
N.Y. 266, 169 N.E. 380 (1929).
A subsequent case declined to follow thiis ruling and held that the
words "Nazi and Communist" as applied to a lawyer, were defamatory
per se. The alleged libel in Levy v. Gelber, 175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S.2d
148 (Sup. Ct. 1941), was in the form of an open letter to the members
of a union. No special damages were alleged. Upholding the sufficiency
of the complaint the court stated in 25 N.Y.S.2d at 150:
Certainly, in light of the public attitude today as evidenced, only in small
part, by these legislative enactments it may not be held as a matter of law
that to place an attorney falsely in the category of those to whom Government employ is forbidden does not adversely affect his standing in his
profession.

Cf. Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News Co., 139 Ill. 345, 28 N.E. 692
(1891); Toomey v. Jones, 124 Okla. 167, 254 Pac. 736 (1926).
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The result reached in the instant case appears to this writer to be a
reasonable one. Other cases on the subject present the anomalous situation in the law of defamation, viz., is there a rational basis for the
differentiation that written defamatory words are libelous per se, while
the same words if uttered orally are not slanderous per se? New means of
communication have found the courts unprepared to resolve this "historical distinction." PROSSER, TORTS § 92 (1941). For the view that this
distinction is "mere historical accident" see 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 363-65 (5th ed. 1942); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY

537 (2d ed. 1923). For a contrary view see Justice
Cardozo's opinion in Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 175 N.E. 505 (1931)
where he states in 175 N.E. at 506:
OF ENGLISH LAW

The schism in the law of defamation between the older wrong of slander
and the newer one of libel is not the product of mere accident.... It has its
genesis in evils which the years have not erased. Many things that are defamatory may be said with impunity through the medium of speech. Not
so, however, when speech is caught upon the wing and transmuted into
print. What gives the sting to the writing is its permanence oj form. The
spoken word dissolves, but the written one abides and "perpetuates the
scandal." [Emphasis supplied].

Historically, words have been held to be slanderous per se in the
following instances: the imputation of a~serious crime, Heming v. Power,
10 M. & W. 564, 152 Eng. Rep. 595 (Ex. 1842); the imputation of certain loathsome diseases, Kaucher v. Blinn, 29 Ohio St. 62, 23 Am. Rep.
727 (1875); imputations affecting the plaintiff in his office, Fitzgerald
v. Piette, 180 Wis. 625, 193 N.W. 86 (1923); and in some jurisdictions,
the imputation of unchastity to a woman, Cooper v. Seaverns, 81 Kan.
267, 105 Pac. 509 (1909). Contra: Pollardv. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225 (1876).
The instant case fits in the first category above, but there appears to
be no great distinguishing feature between this case and Mencher v.
Chesley, supra, though the latter is in libel. It is beyond doubt that the
name Communist or Communist sympathizer would subject a person to
public aversion and expose him to public hatred, ridicule and contempt
by the vast majority of American citizens. Pecyk v. Semoncheck, supra.
That there isa great American aversion for Communism has been
illustrated. See Reisman, Democracy and Defamation, 42 COL. L.REv.
1282, 1304 (1942). In 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 620 (1938) the rationale is found that one of the reasons for permitting an action in libel
without proof of special damage isto allow the plaintiff to vindicate
himself. Should not this reasoning be extended to false, oral accusations
of Communism?
One celebrated English case involved the "historical distinction." In
Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng.Rep. 367 (1812), the
issue was whether an action would lie for words written, notwithstanding
that such an action would not lie for them ifspoken. Lord Mansfield, at
4 Taunt.364, 365, 128 Eng.Rep.at 371 stated:

RECENT DECISIONS
I cannot, upon principle, make any difference between words written
and words spoken, as to the right which arises on them of bringing an
action.... So it has been argued that writing shews more deliberate malignity; but the same answer suffices, that the action is not maintainable upon
the ground of the malignity, but for the damage sustained. So, it is argued
that written scandal is more generally diffused than words spoken, and is
therefore actionable; but an assertion made in a public place, as upon the
Royal Exchange, ... may be much more extensively diffused than a few
printed papers dispersed, or a private letter: it is true that a newspaper may
be very generally read, but that is all casual.
...

If the matter were for the first time to be decided at this day, I should
have no hesitation in saying, that no action could be maintained for written
scandal which could not be maintained for the words if they had been
spoken.

That the "distinction" has remained as a vestige in present-day decisions.
see Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947), the
court intimating that it was not prepared to do what Lord Mansfield
declared he could not do in Thorley v. Kerry, supra, viz., abolish the
"distinction" between written and oral defamation. The concurring opinion stated in 73 N.E.2d at 33: "Abolition of the line between libel and
slander would ... be too extreme a break with the past to be achieved
without legislation."
A writing is defamatory per se that is, actionable without allegation of
special damage, if it tends to expose a person to hatred, contempt, or
aversion, or to induce an evil or unsavory opinion of him in the minds
of a substantial number of the community, even though it may impute
no moral turpitude to him. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909).
Oral utterances could definitely meet the requisites of this rule. A fortiori,
the policy which has been instituted to combat Communism would
reasonably lead substantial numbers of persons to believe those clothed
with the Communist stigma to be immoral. If this is a reasonable inference it *then appears it would not be unreasonable to declare false
accusations in this area as slanderous per se.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in rendering the decision in Peck v. Tribune Co.,
supra, a libel action for a false whiskey endorsement found it unnecessary to decide if the publication was a tort per se. He thought it sufficient
to do the plaintiff practical harm if a large number of persons knew of
the publication and an "appreciable" fraction of that number regarded
her with contempt.
So it is that a great majority of decisions will support the finding that
special damage must be alleged and proved for slanderous statements
spoken orally, while at the same time if the words had been written they
would be actionable per se. We can safely predict that judicial decisions
will adhere to the "historical distinction" which has been termed "mere
accident" by numerous writers in jurisprudence. Mr. Justice Holmes
was not thinking in abstraction when he wrote in his, THE COMMON LAW,
p. 5 (1881):
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A very common phenomenon, and one very familiar to the student of
history, is this. The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish
a rule or a formula. In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains.

Many courts did not have the federal enactment, 18 U.S.C. § 2385

(Supp. 1952), upon which to find that orally charging one with being a
Communist was slanderous per se. Perhaps other state courts will make
use of that provision in the future. The "historical distinction" is incongruous when it presumes damage if words are written on a postal card
for example, while a plaintiff bringing an action on the same words orally
uttered before a gathering of 2,000 people must allege and prove special
damages. It is very doubtful that many courts will abolish the "distinction" which has become so well entrenched. It would seem feasible for
the courts to abolish the "distinction" and to treat each factual situation
on a case to case basis, especially in the area under discussion. Experience has shown us that the doctrine of stare decisis will continue to
plague and confuse judicial minds at the expense of justice.
Wilbur L. Pollard

UNFAIR COMPETITION -

INFRINGING USE OF TRADE MARKS -

USE

Consolidated
Cosmetics v. Neilson Chemical Co., 109 F. Supp. 300 (E.D. Mich.
1952). The plaintiff manufactured cosmetics and toiletries and had
established and registered the trade-marks "Tabu" and "Taboo" in conjunction with the sale of its products. Defendants, in 1945, filed an
application with the United States Patent Office for registration of its
trade-mark "Rustaboo" for a chemical and detergent preparation designed to clean and prepare metal surfaces for painting. The Patent
Office accepted the application. Plaintiff brought a suit in equity to
enjoin the use of such trade-mark and to reverse the decision of the
Patent Office on the ground of unfair competition and trade-mark infringement. The District Court affirmed the decision of the Patent Office,
stating that the goods in question did not possess the same descriptive
properties and that there was little chance of confusion as regards the
trade-marks used with these products.
This case substantiates an ever-growing tendency of the courts. Where
the goods are noncompetitive and are not of the same descriptive
properties, the courts have discounted the likelihood of confusion in the
similarity of trade-marks and have generally favored the new applicants.
American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372 (1926); GoodallSanford, Inc. v. Landers Corp., 187 F.2d 639 (C.C.P.A. 1951); McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Isenberg, 167 F.2d 510 (C.C.P.A. 1948);
or SIMILAR TRADE MARKS ON DISSIMILAR PRODUCTS.

-
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Goldsmith Bros. v. Atlas Supply Co., 148 F.2d 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1945);
Proctor& Gamble Co. v. Sweets Laboratories,Inc., 137 F.2d 365 (C.C.
P.A. 1943).
The modern view holds that actual competition is no longer an essential element in determining trade-mark infringement as constituting
unfair competition. Lunsford, The Trade Mark Anomaly, 42 TnADF,
MARK RiP. 1 (1953). The statutes likewise, have this view in mind.
Under the Federal Trade Commission Acts, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. 1952), actual competition is no longer
necessary for the enjoining of unfair competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices. The fact that a trade-mark probably will not deprive
the original user of trade is no longer a valid defense. Stork Restaurant,
Inc. v. Marcus, 36 F. Stipp. 90 (E.D. Pa. 1941). More recently, confusion has been held to be an important test. Chappell v. Goltsman, 99
F. Supp. 970 (M.D. Ala. 1951).
How far the courts will extend trade-mark infringement into the field
of noncompetitive goods remains a matter of conjecture. See, e.g., Lady
Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc., 317 IIl. App. 451, 46
N.E.2d 165 (1943); Hanson v. Triangle Publications,Inc., 163 F.2d
74, 78 (8th Cir. 1947). There has been pointed objection to this
tendency. Comment, 44 ILL. L. REv. 182 (1949). It is argued that the
object of the courts in trade-mark cases should be protection of the
public and not the protection of the trade-mark rights of noncompetitive
producers.
Even though under the modern interpretation it makes little difference
if the products are in actual competition, still, without proof of confusion of the public and prospective purchasers, there is no trade-mark
infringement irrespective of any similarity between goods or trademarks. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §§ 730-31 (1938). In effect, this is the
interpretation which the courts put on the Lanham Trade Mark Act, 60
STAT. 427, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1946). The Lanham Act, while
making the likelihood of confusion as to source the basic test, American
Automobile Ins. Co. v. American Auto Club, 184 F.2d 407, 409-10 (9th
Cir. 1950), still pursues the interests of the trade-mark owner in attempting to incorporate into the act the common law policy of strict protection
of property rights and the then existing similar construction of earlier
trade-mark acts. Martin, The Defense of Trade Marks and Unfair Competition Cases, 41 TsADE MARK REP. 99 (1951).
Although, generally, the modern trend of the courts has placed the
emphasis in determining trade-mark infringement on the likelihood of
confusion as to source of the product, still there is no clear cut standard
when the test is applied to noncompetitive goods. Where the rights of the
infringer have been narrowly construed the courts have applied the
dilution doctrine. L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272, 273-74
(2d Cir. 1934):
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The theory on which the wrong has been extended to include the use of
the mark on goods never made or sold by the owner, is that, though the
infringer's user cannot at the moment take away his customers, it may
indirectly do so by tarnishing his reputation, or it may prevent him from
extending his trade to the goods on which the infringer is using the mark.
Dilution is any activity on the part of one producer which somehow decreases the consumer's association of use or product with a particular
trade name of another producer.
This doctrine is based on the rule that a trade-mark is a property right
and must be protected strictly in the favor of the owner. This was an
important factor in the earlier cases. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92

(1879). This doctrine has received some recognition. PhiladelphiaStorage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N.Y. Supp. 176 (Sup. Ct.
1937); Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264
N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N.Y. Supp. 821
(1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 262 N.Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933). The dilution

doctrine, though usually involving noncompetitive goods has been
applied in one case involving similar competitive articles with similar
name. Pro-Phy-Lac-Tic Brush Co. v. Jordan Marsh Co., 165 F.2d 549

(1st Cir. 1948) (hairbrushes).
The instant case is in accord with the modern trend of the courts in

impliedly rejecting the dilution doctrine. Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1952); Creamette Co. v.
Conlin, 191 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1951); American Automobile Ins. Co. v.

American Auto Club, supra; Chappell v. Goltsman, supra. The test now
seems to be based on the descriptive properties of noncompetitive articles
in determining whether confusion as to source or product would result
from the use of a similar name. White Co. v. Vita-Var Corp., 182 F.2d
217 (C.C.P.A. 1950).

The courts in the trade-mark cases, however, have never decidedly
rejected the producers property interest. As was stated in Yale Electric
Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928):
However, it has of recent years been recognized that a merchant may
have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field
of his own exploitation to justify interposition by a court. His mark is his
authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his
name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the owner's reputation,
whose quality no longer lies within his own control. This is an injury, even
though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use....
Cf. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1940).
In the cases concerning noncompetitive foods, drugs, and cosmetics the
more recent decisions have tended to construe the rights of the infringer
narrowly. Mock, Status of Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Trade Marks, 39
TRADE MARK REP. 283 (1949):
In general, a mark used for a drug has hitherto not been considered to
anticipate a mark used for cosmetics and vice versa. There are a number of

